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I want to thank Dean Starr, Professor Kmiec, and Pepperdine Law
School for inviting me to talk about the cases from last term that deal with
issues in the arena of law and politics. Just as politics can be messy, so are
these cases. In the two major cases, 2 there are a total of twelve opinions-
six in each case-and essentially no majority opinions, except for one
portion of the opinion in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry.3 If Chief Justice Roberts is really serious about encouraging the
Court to demonstrate more unity in its holdings and to speak "softly and
unanimously,"4 he did not succeed in these cases. In my remarks today, I
will discuss first the campaign finance cases and then conclude with the
redistricting case, focusing mostly on the partisan redistricting aspect of that
case, but also providing brief observations on the voting rights aspects.
This term the Court decided two campaign finance reform cases,
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission5 and Randall v.
Sorrell.6 The most important of these is the second decision, which
involved a Vermont campaign finance law that restricted both expenditures
and contributions in state candidate campaigns. Two of the results from
these cases were unsurprising. First, a unanimous Court held in Wisconsin
Right to Life that as-applied challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act ("BCRA") will be allowed.7 This conclusion is consistent with the
campaign finance jurisprudence of the last thirty-plus years. Buckley v.
agreed that the effects test in Section 5 should be extended. We had argued that the intent test, that
the Supreme Court recognized in Mobile against Bolden -- I know you think it was wrong, but that
was the Supreme Court's interpretation -- should have been extended. Again, as you said, the
compromise that you and Senator Dole worked out was enacted into law and signed into law by
President Reagan. And the Voting Rights Act has continued to be an important legislative tool to
ensure that most precious of rights, which is preservative of all other rights. There was never any
dispute about that basic proposition.
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, Political Science, and
Policy, Planning and Development; Director, USC-Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics.
I appreciate Gabriel Morgan's excellent research assistance.
2. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
3. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2607, 2612.
4. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2006, § 1, at 1.
5. 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
7. Wis. Right to Life, 126 S. Ct. at 1017-18.
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Valeo 8 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission9 were both facial
challenges under the First Amendment, and both contained language making
it clear that the Court anticipated as-applied challenges in the future.' Not
surprisingly, Wisconsin Right to Life was a unanimous opinion and one of
the Court's shorter opinions.
The second unsurprising result, in my view, is that expenditure limits in
campaign finance laws are unconstitutional. This is a clear holding of
Buckley." I did not expect that the ruling in Buckley would be revisited by
the Court when it had the chance to do so--as it did this Term in Randall v.
Sorrell.12 A few others who study law and politics had predicted that the
Court might be willing to look again at its holding in Buckley invalidating
expenditure limits in campaigns. 3 Some believed that the decades of
experience with campaign finance laws after Buckley would surely convince
any rational person that the Buckley approach is not a workable one. The
Buckley framework-where expenditure limits are unconstitutional and
assessed through a strict scrutiny lens, but contribution limits are often
constitutional and receive a lesser degree of scrutiny 14-has resulted in a
system where the demand for campaign money is unconstrained, but the
supply is limited.' 5 In such a market, not surprisingly, one sees evasions of
the regulatory structure by candidates who need substantial funds to meet
their unregulated demand. At the time of Buckley, a case that was decided
before much experience with the federal election campaign laws, we simply
did not know what a disaster this bifurcated system was going to be. Now
we do. Surely, some scholars reasoned, the justices will look at the reality of
the political environment and change the decision with regard to expenditure
limits. 16 That did not happen this Term.
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
9. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
10. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198. See also Elizabeth Garrett,
McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 242 (2004) (discussing challenges in as-
applied challenges in campaign finance context).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54.
12. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2481 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance
Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 174-76 (2004).
14. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
15. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
311-312 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence ofMcConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 67-68
(2004) (noting that there are various reasons the Court could use to overturn Buckley, but that "a
change in campaign finance jurisprudence is not going to happen until five Justices are comfortable
overruling the central aspect of Buckley").
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The second reason some thought that the Court might rethink
expenditure limits comes from hints in recent cases concerning the political
process. Buckley held that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."17 There seems to be a
suggestion in cases since Buckley, however, that the Court might be willing
to reconsider its views of the equalization rationale with respect to some
campaign finance restrictions. The state interest identified in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce "--combating "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas"' 9-sounded to
some like an equality rationale.20 McConnell seemed to restore Austin's
vitality by relying on the precedent.2
Moreover, Justice Breyer has defended a state interest that is related to
equality: the need to democratize the political process and widen political
participation past the few who actively participate now.22 Most recently, he
has developed this analysis in his book Active Liberty.23 The participatory
democracy rationale has a flavor of the equality arguments made to support
expenditure limits, and some scholars saw this as a portent of a change in
judicial approach. Certainly, the Court must have been aware of this line of
analysis when it considered the Vermont statute because Judge Calabresi
had forcefully argued in a circuit court opinion in this case that the Court's
jurisprudence is "impoverished" because it does not deal directly with
egalitarian concerns which are, "perhaps, at the very heart of the problem.,
24
The bottom line in Randall, however, is that the Court will not revisit
the issue of expenditure limits. Indeed, I predict that if the Buckley
framework is overruled by this Court in a future case, it will be overruled in
the other direction. I do not see a five-Justice majority willing to overrule
Buckley in order to apply less strict scrutiny to expenditure limits. We might
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
18. 494 U.S. 652 (1986).
19. Id. at 660.
20. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 105, 108-11 (1990); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign
Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 412 (1992); see also John
M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 627-34 (2005).
21. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 290 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning
of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1754-56 (2001); Hasen, supra note 16, at
58 (discussing Justice Breyer's participatory democracy rationale).
23. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 15
(2005).
24. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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see, however, a five-Justice majority apply strict scrutiny to contribution
limitations and hold that sort of regulation unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. We can see hints of that possibility in some of the campaign
finance opinions. Justices Thomas and Scalia have explicitly said that they
would overturn contribution restrictions under the First Amendment, 2 and
they reiterate that position again in Randall.26  Justice Kennedy has
somewhat less clearly signaled his view that contribution limits should be
required to pass strict scrutiny, 27 and he does so again in Randall.28 Justice
Alito writes separately in Randall to underscore his view that it was not
necessary for the Court to decide whether to overrule Buckley-thereby
leaving the issue for further resolution.29 When the issue is squarely
presented, I predict that he will not be interested in overruling Buckley to let
more restrictions stand, but rather to say more are unconstitutional.
Of course, we do not know from Randall what Chief Justice Roberts
would do if the Court was faced with the decision whether to overrule the
Buckley framework. He did not join Justice Alito's opinion. He did join
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion, which included some discussion of the
value of stare decisis in this area. 30 But my guess is that if a case comes
before the Court that requires it to revisit Buckley, the Buckley framework
may be in trouble, and it could well be overruled in a way that will result in
more campaign finance restrictions being found unconstitutional.
So, then, what is surprising with regard to the holding in the Vermont
case? The surprising holding, in my view, is that the limit on contributions
contained in the Vermont statute was unconstitutional. 31 This is unexpected
because the trend in the cases had been to defer to the legislature's judgment
with regard to limitations on contributions.32 The First Amendment standard
of judicial scrutiny is less stringent than the standard applied to expenditure
limitations; thus, restrictions on contributions more often survive judicial
challenge. Furthermore, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
33
25. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501-02 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 308-310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part),
28. 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2490.
31. Id. at 2499-500.
32. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165.
33. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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the Court had accepted relatively low campaign limits, upholding a limit of
$1,000, indexed for inflation, for certain statewide offices. "
Certainly, it is true that Vermont's limits were lower than those at issue
in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. For example, Vermont
limited individual contributions to $400 in statewide elections over the
course of a two-year period, with the same limitation on political parties.
The limits were not indexed for inflation. My view, after Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, however, was that there would be no limit too
low if the state legislature had decided to put it into place, given the
deference the Court showed to Missouri's decision to stringently limit
contributions in state elections. But the ruling in Vermont proves me wrong.
There are contribution limits that are too low. These limits are too low.
What more general conclusions can we draw from Randall that may be
relevant to future campaign finance cases? There are at least three. First,
we see in the Vermont case the increasingly sophisticated use by courts of
empirical evidence derived from the social sciences. This evidence is
presented to courts through expert testimony, amicus briefs, and the
arguments of the parties. In Buckley, there was no discussion of empirical
evidence or social science literature because there was little such work
available. We did not have experience with relatively comprehensive
campaign finance regulation until passage of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, the law at issue in Buckley's facial challenge. In Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, decided in 2000, one of the questions before the
Court was to determine the quantum of evidence needed to support a
legislative judgment regarding restrictions on contributions. 5 The Court's
answer to this question in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC was,
"Not a lot. We'll take almost anything a legislature throws at us." The
Court considered an affidavit by a legislator and it noted a few anecdotes
from newspaper articles. On this scarce empirical foundation the majority
accepted the contribution limitation of about $1,000 as amply warranted to
combat quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of such.36
Contrast that approach with the opinions in McConnell and Randall. In
McConnell, the record from the lower court contained 100,000 pages of
evidence and testimony from more than 200 witnesses, many of them expert
witnesses. 37 Randall's plurality opinion includes a relatively sophisticated
and detailed analysis of social science research. Justice Breyer discussed the
34. Id. at 383-84.
35. Id. at 391.
36. See id.
37. See David B. Magleby, The Importance of the Record in McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J.
285 passim (2004); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 2004: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 28
(2004).
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effect of certain levels of campaign contributions on competitive races, not
on average races, which had been the lower court's approach. 38 Relying on
work in the social sciences, he addressed the question: What do these very
strict restrictions on the amount of political contributions by individuals and
parties mean for outcomes in close and contested races?
This trend in campaign finance cases is noteworthy and will change the
way lawyers litigate in this area. It also demonstrates that many of the
current Justices were trained in the modem law school where we emphasize
interdisciplinary approaches and, in particular, discover the lessons for law
that can be drawn from rigorous work in the social sciences. Today's law
schools do not dwell on doctrinal approaches to legal questions. Instead,
what many of us teach is that case law is merely a form of policy produced
by certain actors in our political system, and thus law must be analyzed with
the tools provided by the empirical social sciences, as well as other
disciplines.3 9 As an administrative law scholar, Justice Breyer taught using
such an approach, and he still judges from that perspective. Moreover,
judges like Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were trained in that sort
of approach to the law, and one can see the influence of interdisciplinary
legal study in these cases.
Of course, even though social science research is playing a role in the
outcomes of some of the cases in law and politics, social science data cannot
always conclusively resolve policy questions. Studies can inform and guide
us, but they do not settle the issue. For example, debate continues in the
social science literature over whether contribution limits increase
competition or whether they stifle competition, and under what
circumstances they will have particular effects.4 ° In short, politics are
complicated. It is not clear to me that even the sophisticated and well-
trained Justices that we now have on the Court can fully grapple with the
difficult empirical assessments necessary to construct reasonable and
comprehensive policy in this arena. Rather, the necessity of this type of
judgment and the need to revise policy in light of changed circumstances or
better information mean that legislatures should take the lead in this area, not
courts.
Second, the plurality opinion in Randall demonstrates a willingness to
consider seriously the argument that robust competitiveness is a necessary
38. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (2006).
39. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 772 (1987).
40. See, e.g., David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy:
Evidence from the States, 5 ELECTION L.J. 23 (2006).
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condition for a healthy and well-functioning democracy. Much work in the
social sciences is aimed at determining how elections can be made more
competitive. Justice Breyer's description of a well-functioning participatory
democracy in his scholarly work and judicial opinions seems to presume
some level of political competition.4' Whether other Justices share this
concern about competitiveness is not yet clear, however. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito joined this part of the opinion,42 but whether they
joined it because of its competition rationale is unclear. I am dubious that
the value of political competition is doing much work for Justices other than
Breyer, because, when the Court turned to the partisan gerrymandering
case, 43 which is all about political competition, there is not much discussion
of this value, and there is very little use of empirical studies concerning
competitiveness. So if this is a vibrant jurisprudential theory, we would
have seen it throughout League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.
Yet, it is virtually nonexistent in that case that implicates competition more
directly.
The discussion of competition in Randall is still significant, however. It
demonstrates that the Justices are approaching law and political process
cases, in part, from a structural perspective. Increasingly, influential
scholars in the law and politics world have argued that courts should focus
on ensuring that the appropriate political structures and institutional
frameworks have been put in place to ensure individual rights, rather than
using the traditional judicial approach that focuses more directly on
individual rights.44 Some scholars argue that political institutions should be
designed to maximize political competition, and courts should determine the
results of these cases using competition as the yardstick.45 Whether one
embraces competition as one of the primary objectives of institutional design
or not, some sort of structural approach is apparent in virtually all the
opinions in these cases, and it is certainly influential in Breyer's plurality
opinion.
Third, Justice Breyer has a great deal of influence not just on the
substance of this opinion-i.e., the emphasis on competitiveness, social
science data, and a structural approach to political process cases-but also
on the methodology of the decision. Unfortunately, that influence leads to
negative consequences for political process cases because Justice Breyer
41. See BREYER, supra note 23, at 46-47; Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV 245, 252-53 (2002); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495-500.
43. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
44. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
45. See, e.g., lssacharoff& Pildes, supra note 44, at 644; Pildes, supra note 44, at 1625-26.
560
[Vol. 34: 553, 2007] The Political Process
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tends to favor complex tests that can produce unclarity. After Randall, not
only are lawyers uncertain how to argue these cases, but lawmakers will also
be uncertain how to write statutes that will withstand constitutional
challenge. Justice Breyer's affinity for multi-pronged standards, with many
related qualitative decisions that are hard to apply consistently and with
certainty, is a feature of other areas of his jurisprudence. Those of us who
study administrative law recognize this aspect of Justice Breyer's judicial
approach. As a judge in administrative law cases (and as a leading scholar
in this area), he often favors open-ended standards, in sharp contrast to
Justice Scalia (another administrative law scholar) who advocates for bright
line, clear-cut rules.4 6  In the administrative law world, it is the contrast
between Mead47 and Chevron.48
Similarly, you can see Justice Breyer's methodological approach in the
plurality's First Amendment test for contribution limits. First, one looks for
"danger signs" 49 with respect to the contribution limits. Several danger
signs are listed: whether they are lower than limits that have been upheld in
the past or lower than any state currently has; whether there is one limit per
election cycle, rather than one limit for primaries and another limit for
general elections; and whether the same restrictions are applied to parties as
are applied to individuals.5 ° So how clear is this first part of the test that will
determine the intensity of review in the second part? Not very clear at all-
many questions remain to be resolved in future cases. How many of the
danger signs are required to trigger independent judicial assessment of the
regulation, rather than judicial deference to legislative judgments? What is
the hierarchy of the signs? Are they the only danger signs, or are there
others that we will learn about in future cases? We do not know. We have
no idea. We do not even know why these were picked as danger signs.
At any rate, analysis of danger signs is only the first part of the test.
Once a court finds those danger signs-or some subset of them, or some
other danger signs yet to be revealed-then it does not defer to the
legislature's judgment about the appropriate restriction on campaign
contributions. Instead, the court independently examines the record to see if
the regulation is "closely drawn" to fit the governmental interest. 51 In that
46. Compare Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1986), with Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE L.J. 511 (1989).
47. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
48. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
49. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006).
50. Id. at 2503 (Thomas & Scalia, J.J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2495-500.
independent analysis in Randall, Justice Breyer discussed the empirical
social science studies and decided he would rather focus on the effect of
contributions on contested elections than on average elections.5 2 Thus, he
rejected the approach of the legislature and lower courts. In short, this case
muddies the water tremendously, and the Court's tendency to make the law
uncertain and unclear will be a theme of mine as we continue to look at the
other important law and politics case decided this Tenn.
In conclusion, because of the many unclarities of Randall v. Sorrell, we
will see more cases involving campaign finance laws coming to the Supreme
Court, and it is very difficult to predict how this new Court will resolve
them. I think the area of law and politics is wide open right now. What
cases can we expect? We will see disclosure cases come up. Currently,
there is a split among the circuits about the constitutionality of disclosure
requirements, and some of these cases implicate initiative contests as well as
candidate elections. 53  Other cases dealing with aspects of the initiative
process may well reach the Supreme Court, including regulation of petition
gatherers.5 4  We will see cases involving political parties and campaigns
because there are hints in Randall v. Sorrell that future cases could turn out
differently from cases decided only a few years ago.55 We will see
challenges to some of the specific provisions of BCRA, like regulation of
527 organizations, regulation of campaign activities on the Internet, as-
applied challenges to electioneering advertisement restrictions, and perhaps
others. The Court has already agreed to hear a case next Term dealing with
a state law that forbids a union from using non-members' shop fees for
political purposes without first receiving authorization.56
The second important law and politics case from the rookie year of the
Roberts Court comes out of Texas, and it deals with political and racial
52. Id.
53. Compare Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 350, 355 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding constitutional an
Indiana statute requiring political advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate to reveal the identity of those who paid for the advertisement), with ACLU v. Heller, 378
F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cit. 2004) (holding that a Nevada statute requiring anyone who funds the
publication of "any material or information relating to an election, candidate or any question on a
ballot" to identify themselves and their addresses on any published material was an
unconstitutionally overbroad means to achieve the state's otherwise legitimate interest). See also
Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in
Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 301-03 (2005).
54. See generally ANDREW M. GLOGER, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, PAID
PETITIONERS AFTER PRETE, (2006), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%202006-
1%20Paid%20Petitioners.pdf.
55. The Court's discussion of political parties and their involvement with campaigns in Randall
v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. at 2497-98, has a different tone than that in Federal Election Commission v.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm 'n., 553 U.S. 431 (2001), suggesting that the current Court's
approach may be different in the future.
56. Wash. ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352 (Wash. 2006),
cert. granted sub. nom. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5417 (U.S. Sept. 26,
2006) (No. 05-1589).
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gerrymandering. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry57 is as
fractured as the first case in terms of the number of opinions, but the total
length of the opinions is even greater. This case follows on a 2004 case,
Vieth v. Jubelirer,58 another partisan gerrymandering case in which four
Justices had essentially said, "No court ever strikes these partisan
gerrymanders down as unconstitutional. Davis v. Bandemer 9 did not
produce a standard that judges can apply. Therefore, we ought to hold
theses claims to be nonjusticiable." Justice Kennedy wrote the pivotal
opinion in Vieth, where he argued that the Court may someday be able to
fashion a judicially manageable standard to review these cases, but he
conceded that he does not know what that standard is going to be, and that
no one-parties or other Justices-had suggested a workable standard in
Vieth. 60 But he was not willing to say these cases are nonjusticiable, so
courts are still open to hearing claims of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering. That was the unsatisfying state of the law after Vieth.
The events in Texas were unfolding as Vieth was decided, and once it
reached the Supreme Court, many observers thought that if any case was
going to lead to Court intervention, surely this was the case. The main
lesson of Perry is that even these facts do not warrant a holding of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. What is surprising to me, in light
of the outcome in Perry, is that there are not five Justices willing to say that
all partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, thereby making it
clear to parties that these cases should not be taken to court. Instead, the
recourse for those objecting to districting plans is to go to Congress, to the
initiative process, or to the state legislature to reform the redistricting
process. The more responsible judicial response in Perry would have been
to explicitly hold claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable, clearly
signaling that litigation will not be successful in these areas, and to send
those who object to redistricting plans as too partisan to other political
institutions. But, again, this Court provides unclarity, confusion and
uncertainty.
Had the Court decided to intervene in this case, it arguably could have
fashioned a relatively clear, judicially-manageable standard aimed only at
mid-decade redistricting plans. Indeed, Justice Stevens framed the central
question presented by this case correctly, in my view, in his separate
opinion: "[I]n every political-gerrymandering claim the Court has
57. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
58. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
59. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
60. Id. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
considered, the focus has been on the map itself, not on the decision to
create the map in the first place., 61 In other words, the question before the
Court was not whether district lines were drawn for purely, or primarily,
partisan reasons, but whether the decision to redistrict in the first place was
undertaken for purely, or primarily, partisan reasons. That decision is
different in the context of mid-decade redistricting plans because, after a
census, the state often has one unproblematic reason to redraw lines: to
comply with the mandate of one person, one vote. 62 Often, legislators also
seek to entrench their own party or to entrench incumbents, but in the case of
many redistricting plans after a census, one clearly legitimate reason exists
to redraw the map. When it comes to mid-decade redistricting plans like the
one in Texas, however, the state is not responding to demographic changes
identified in the census, and it is often quite clear that the only reason for the
new map is to give the one political party-here, the Texas Republican
Party-more advantage in elections by decreasing the competition its
candidates face.
But the Court refused to fashion a test or presumption targeted at mid-
decade redistricting, and Justice Kennedy stated that nothing in the
Constitution or case law warrants looking at these redistricting decisions
with more distrust than any other decision to redistrict. 63 Furthermore,
Kennedy's plurality opinion focused more on the map than the decision to
redistrict, and he noted that there could have been legitimate reasons for
drawing the district lines: the new map "can be seen as making the party
balance more congruent to statewide party power" than the map it
replaced. 64 Interestingly, and in contrast to Randall, the plurality contains
little discussion of relevant social science studies, such as the symmetry test
proposed by some experts and discussed in Justice Stevens's opinion,65
which might have provided the Court guidance in fashioning a standard.
Let me be clear: although this case concerned a gerrymander to protect
Republicans, both parties engage in this behavior. This map was a response
to a Democratic gerrymander put in place the decade before-Justice
Stevens' description of the facts of the case refers to "the Texas Democratic
Party's sordid history of manipulating the electoral process to perpetuate its
stranglehold on political power., 66 One of the interesting ironies of the case
is that Congressman Martin Frost was the architect of the Democratic
redistricting plan designed to protect Democrats from competition, and he
61. Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the State's brief).
62. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 2610.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was one of the members of Congress harmed by the new districts put in
place by this Republican map.
As with Justice Breyer's test in Randall, the Court's decision in Perry
fails to provide lawyers and policymakers with clear answers. Instead of
following Justice Scalia's approach and declaring partisan gerrymandering
cases to be nonjusticiable, the Court holds out hope that some cases-
presumably more extreme than this one-will provide a judicial remedy.
Yet, the Court's failure to provide redress here strongly suggests that
litigation will be unavailing. It would have been better-and it would reflect
legal reality-for the Court to have clearly stated: "We are never going to
find an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Do not bring any more of
these cases to court. Seek your solutions in the political process." That is
what Scalia wanted to say in Vieth, that is what he wanted to say here, and I
think it would have done us all a service if at least four other Justices had
joined him.
I am almost out of time, but I want to make two points with respect to
the claims of racial gerrymandering in this case. First, even though I doubt
any partisan gerrymandering claim will succeed after Vieth and Perry,
partisan considerations often play a role in cases that come to the Court
under the Voting Rights Act. In Perry, for example, the Court held that the
redrawing of District 23's lines violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
because the new map impermissibly diluted the votes of Latino voters. 67 It
is important to keep in mind that the borders of District 23 were changed
mainly, if not entirely, to move Democrats out of Representative Bonilla's
district, thereby protecting this Republican incumbent. It happened that
these Democrats were Latino voters; therefore, the partisan process gave rise
to a successful claim under the Voting Rights Act. Partisan considerations
play a role in many cases where racial discrimination is at issue, particularly
when voters of that race tend to vote as a bloc for one political party.
Drawing lines to move them out of the district and reduce their partisan
power is also likely to produce vote dilution claims under the Voting Rights
Act.
Second, much is being made of Chief Justice Roberts's separate opinion
in this case, partly because, as Professor Kmiec said in his initial remarks,
Roberts did not write very many. But the opinion also has received attention
because of its tone. Many have quoted the line, "It is a sordid business, this
divvying us up by race, 68 to suggest that Roberts is not going to be as open
67. Id. at 2614-19.
68. Id. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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to claims under the Voting Rights Act as the Court has been in the past. I
think that this conclusion about the future of voting rights cases in the
Roberts Court is probably accurate. Several passages in Roberts's opinion
are noteworthy. For example, he refers to some of the analysis of Justice
Kennedy's opinion dealing with District 23 as "blushingly ironic"' 69 and
terms part of its reasoning as "the majority's fig leaf."7 °
This tone in Chief Justice Roberts's opinion is particularly interesting
because in his analysis under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Justice
Kennedy resisted divvying people up by race. In the compactness analysis
undertaken pursuant to Thornburg v. Gingles,7" the majority determined that
Latinos living in Austin and Latinos living near the border with Mexico may
not share a community of interests solely by virtue of the fact that they are
all Latinos.72 Thus, the Court emphasized that people of the same race or
ethnicity may not share a community of interest because they live in
different places, have different experiences, espouse different viewpoints. In
fact, the majority did not engage in the sort of "divvying up" by race that I
thought would have been necessary to prompt Roberts's comment,
suggesting that what we are seeing here may be a reaction to more than just
this case, and that it may be a portent of a significant change in voting rights
jurisprudence in the Roberts Court era.
QUESTIONS BY MARCIA COYLE
MARCIA COYLE: Professor Garrett, I read my local newspapers. I try
to read them every day, and one of the things I have noticed is there has been
a lot of talk about problems with voting machines. And I wonder: Are we
going to see, do you think, a return of Bush v. Gore,73 not in sense that the
Supreme Court would be choosing our next president, but its use in other
contexts even though in the language of the opinion the Court said it was
deciding this case for this time?
What have you seen happening out in the land in terms of litigation
involving Bush v. Gore?
ELIZABETH GARRETT: One of the most objectionable aspects of
Bush v. Gore was that the Court said, in effect, "This is not an ordinary
precedent. Our rationale is good for this case only.",74 The rule that judicial
69. Id. at 2657 (Robert, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
70. Id. (Robert, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
71. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
72. Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2618.
73. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
74. Id. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
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decisions have precedential value so that principles articulated in one
decision will apply to similar decisions in the future is an important
characteristic of judicial decision making. It is one way to keep judges
modest-and it's necessary because, no matter how many times judges like
Roberts claim to support judicial modesty, it is very hard to keep Justices
modest. In fact, many do not really want to be modest; just like other
political actors, they want to use the power that they have to reach results
they support.
So our system uses features of institutional design to enforce modesty,
and one key aspect of that design in the judicial realm is that judges will
have to apply a principle articulated in one case to future cases that are
similar. Judges know that in those subsequent cases, which they cannot
entirely foresee when they make the initial decision, the principle may lead
to decisions they are not going to like. That constrains them when they
articulate the holding in the first place. Thus, the "one time only" feature of
Bush v. Gore is particularly disturbing because the Justices are announcing
that they are not going to be consistent over time, freeing themselves to
ignore the equal protection holding when it would lead them to an outcome
they do not like as much as selecting George W. Bush to be President.
The problem for the Supreme Court is that it cannot completely control
how its decision will be used by lower courts-that is, whether lower courts
will agree to view Bush v. Gore as precedent in the usual sense or as a "one
case only" decision. The Court can enforce this only by agreeing to hear
cases relying on the precedent, reversing them, and reiterating the
unprincipled position that Bush v. Gore was a one-shot deal. Currently, a
few courts have been using the equal protection holding of Bush v. Gore to
invalidate some aspects of state election laws. We saw that in the Ninth
Circuit in a case arising out of the recall of Governor Davis, where the panel
relied on Bush v. Gore to uphold a challenge to punch card voting machines
used in the most populous counties in California.75 That decision was
vacated by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc,76 but the rationale in Bush v.
Gore is being used by lawyers arguing other election law cases, and
sometimes they are succeeding in these claims. 77
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."). See also David A.
Strauss, What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 184,
197-99 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
75. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
76. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
77. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898-99 (N.D. I1. 2002); Stewart v. Blackwell,
444 F.3d 843, 859-62 (6th Cir. 2006). The decision in Stewart was vacated after the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted a petition for rehearing of the case en banc. See Order Granting Rehearing
Certainly, if one takes the holding of Bush v. Gore seriously and
considers it as ordinary precedent, it could have significant effects on
election laws in this country, allowing claims when a state has voting
machines or other practices that differ from one district to another and affect
how votes are counted. Moreover, I think one could take the reasoning
beyond differences within a state to use Bush v. Gore to attack differences in
the electoral process among states. Why shouldn't we be concerned that
differences in election procedures and technologies might cause an
Oklahoman's vote in a national election to be treated differently from a
Missourian's vote? If we take the holding in Bush v. Gore seriously, some
of these variations in voting practices could lead to a great deal of judicial
intervention, particularly because many of the rules and practices concerning
elections are determined locally.
My guess is that if these cases begin to be brought to any great degree,
the Supreme Court will take one of them, and we will find out if the Justices
were really serious that Bush v. Gore was a precedent that was good for one
time only.
AUDIENCE QUESTIONS FACILITATED BY PROFESSOR JAMES
PROFESSOR JAMES: Professor Garrett, one walks away from the
Sorrell case thinking that Chief Justice Roberts wants to keep Buckley
around basically to reflect his respect for stare decisis. Does this give us an
insight into his general view on stare decisis, and can you comment on what
we might look forward to in that regard?
ELIZABETH GARRETT: It is interesting that Roberts did not join
Alito, who wrote, "Whether or not a case can be made for reexamining
Buckley in whole or in part, what matters is that respondents do not do so
here, and so I think it unnecessary to reach the issue."78  This statement
leaves the door open to reconsidering Buckley, and even signals a
willingness to do so. I do not know, however, how much you can read into
Chief Justice Roberts's decision to join Justice Breyer's discussion of stare
decisis because I suspect he was driven by some of his "talk softly, try to
speak unanimously" rhetoric. Overruling Buckley just was not an issue that
was squarely before the Court or necessary for the decision. Randall could
be decided in a way that Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts could join
without taking on Buckley. After Randall, one imagines that there is going
En Banc, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/eleetionlaw/litigation/documents/EnBancOrder.pdf.
However, following a letter from the Appellants, and agreement by the Appellees, the case was
dismissed as moot. See Order Dismissing the Case as Moot, available at htpp://moritzlaw
.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/Order6C-Mootness.pdf.
78. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
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to be an opportunity in the future for the Court to reconsider Buckley in a
case that presents the issue more directly and where it has been argued more
thoroughly.
There are ample signs that many on the Court would be willing to
reconsider Buckley. And that is not surprising--experience since Buckley
strongly demonstrates that the bifurcated system it put into place makes no
sense and leads to negative consequences. In my remarks, I noted the
conservative Justices who I think would overrule Buckley and apply more
rigorous scrutiny to contribution limits, but Justices from the other end of the
political spectrum have also argued against the Buckley framework. For
example, Justice Stevens writes in Randall that he would overrule Buckley,
but he would allow more regulation, including expenditure limits.7 9 Justice
Marshall came to the conclusion that Buckley was flawed although he had
joined the opinion in Buckley. Like Justice Stevens, he would have allowed
more regulation of campaign finance under a new approach.80
PROFESSOR JAMES: My follow-up to the previous question from, if
one does away with Buckley, given your interests in providing certainty for
state and local policy makers and then the PACS and folks who want to
contribute, what do you replace it with? What kind of framework would you
suggest?
ELIZABETH GARRETT: Whatever takes Buckley's place-whether it
is overruled in a way that Justices Scalia and Thomas want or whether it is
revised in the direction advocated by Justice Stevens or that Justice Marshall
might have wanted-it is bound to provide more certainty than the current
jurisprudence. And in that respect, I suppose, either of those results would
be better than the uncertainty we have now.
My own preference is to allow much more experimentation on the part
of states and by the federal government. Thus, I have advocated that the
Court should be especially deferential in this realm and in many cases
dealing with the political process. The strength of our federal system is that
we can experiment with public financing in one state, with relatively low
contribution limits in another state, and with only very aggressive disclosure
laws in other states. Such experimentation is my preference not only in the
area of campaign finance, but in many cases dealing with various kinds of
79. Id. at 2506-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 519
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that he found no "constitutional significance" to the
distinction between limitations on expenditures and restrictions on contributions).
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political institutions. For example, I have argued that the Court erred in
holding the blanket primary unconstitutional; 8 rather, it should have been
open to various forms of primaries and allowed the states to choose the form
they wished, with room for change over time.12 Experimentation with
respect to the political process-within some broad boundaries set forth by
the minimal requirements of the Constitution-does not seem to be the
Court's preference, but it would be mine.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Counting to five, you said you had difficulty
doing that in the context of seeing Buckley overruled. There is, of course,
Justice Stevens, who would overrule it, at least in the direction of suggesting
limitations on expenditure. Justices Souter and Ginsburg seemed equally
inclined in that direction by virtue of reminding people that Buckley did not
eliminate restrictions on campaign expenditures, and talked about proving
them by virtue of heightened scrutiny. You have no hope for the open mind
of Sam Alito or John Roberts?
ELIZABETH GARRETT: I do not have much hope for Justice Alito. I
think he signaled that if this issue had been presented to him squarely, he
would have joined Justices Thomas and Scalia.
Chief Justice Roberts is the mystery here; Roberts is the question mark.
What does it mean that he would not join Justice Alito, and that he did join
the Breyer opinion concerning stare decisis? It is hard to figure that out just
from the opinions themselves, without knowing the dynamics of the decision
making within the Court and the developments as opinions were written.
My guess is, given what we have seen so far, that he is more likely to be in
the camp with Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. But I think it
will be interesting to learn his views in subsequent campaign finance cases.
After McConnell, many of us who work in this field thought, "We
understand where the Court is going: it will show more deference to
legislatures with respect to campaign finance laws." Although I did not
think that deference would extend to holding expenditure limitations
constitutional, I thought virtually any restriction with respect to contribution
limits would be held constitutional. Thus, there would be much more
experimentation in this area in the states, in some cities, and, perhaps, at the
federal level. After Randall, all bets are off. It is all unsettled again, and we
are in the same position of uncertainty that we were in before McConnell.
We need another big case to come down to give us more guidance.
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PROFESSOR KMIEC: I guess I see--cite Justice Alito's opinion a little
bit more tentatively indicating that he just did not think the arguments had
been presented, so kind of a-again, a judicial restraint exercise.
Is not Justice Stevens's argument about the effect of expenditures the
one that the public understands the best? That, in fact, it is no longer
possible for most of the people in this room to run for public office and to
pursue it successfully?
ELIZABETH GARRETT: Most Americans are upset with how the
political process is working, and they think that the system is broken. But
just as they are disturbed that it takes substantial amounts of money-spent
by the candidates from their own funds or perhaps by well-to-do groups and
individuals spending money for independent expenditures-to win elections
in this country, there is also a common sense notion, expressed in Justice
Thomas's dissent,83 that it is hard to imagine a contribution of $251 as
sufficient to corrupt a politician. Remember, those were the kinds of very
stringent limits that the Court was considering here.
Do I think limitations as low as those Vermont enacted are wise policy?
The answer is no. I do not see corruption at those levels. I think that is a
common sense argument that Americans can understand. Do I think they are
unconstitutional? No. But just because something is constitutional does not
mean that it is good policy.
What the public thinks about the value of competition is another
interesting question and may have some common sense answers. Some law
and politics scholars think robust competition is one of the primary
objectives for a political system and a value that the Court should
aggressively enforce. 84 We should have really competitive elections, but we
lack that now because of gerrymandering, campaign finance laws, and other
incumbent-protecting structures. On the other hand, if you ask ordinary
people about competition, they might want competition in other districts, but
they would like to be able to be very sure that they could continue to elect
somebody who shares their values and could continue to have that person
represent them in office for a long time. In other words, incumbency is bad,
except for their representative, and competition is good, unless it keeps them
from electing the politician they want. Some political scientists have
83. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2506 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 542 (2004).
observed that competition is something that scholars value more than
average Americans do.85
So I think the most you can say about the average American's view of
the political process is that she thinks things are really broken, but she is not
sure how to fix the process. That is why I think experimentation at the state
level, together with greater judicial willingness to allow experiments with
different institutions and reforms, would be a positive development for our
democracy and for people's willingness to engage more actively with
politics.
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